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Abstract
Labour issues in global supply chains have been a thorny problem for both buyer firms and their suppliers. Research initially 
focused mostly on the bilateral relationship between buyer firms and suppliers, looking at arm’s-length and close collabora-
tion modes, and the associated mechanisms of coercion and cooperation. Yet continuing problems in the global supply chain 
suggest that neither governance type offers a comprehensive solution to the problem. This study investigates collaborative 
governance, an alternative governance type that is driven by buyer firms setting up a coalition with competitor firms to 
increase leverage and address the supplier and/or host country-specific labour issues. Based on interviews with managers 
involved in the establishment and management of such coalitions and supplier firms in the garment industry, we examine 
the rationale behind collaborative governance and discuss its opportunities and challenges in addressing labour issues in 
global supply chains.
Keywords Coalition · Corporate social responsibility · Global supply chains · Labour issues · Global value chain · 
Collaborative governance
Introduction
Labour rights violations in global supply chains have been a 
vexing problem for buyer firms based in western countries. 
Existing relationships with suppliers, whether at arm’s-
length or through close collaboration, have failed to produce 
the desired solutions—considering, for instance, recent dis-
asters in Bangladesh (Reinecke and Donaghey 2015). Media 
feature many stories about the exploitation of employees, 
under-age employment, sweat-shop labour conditions, and 
health and safety violations in suppliers’ factories in less 
developed countries. Yet all this negative publicity has not 
proved sufficient for buyer and supplier firms to resolve these 
problems.
Over the years, it has been evidenced that top-down 
approaches to controlling labour issues in supply chains are 
ineffective (Neef 2004; Park-Poaps and Rees 2010). The 
premise of relational governance has been to work with sup-
pliers and enable them to develop the necessary capabilities 
to address labour issues in supply chains. Although it may 
be desirable and potentially effective, the relational approach 
can only be rolled out in a limited number of relationships 
due to the managerial attention and costs associated with 
building up such relationships, and therefore, this has appar-
ently not been effective enough to eradicate labour issues in 
supply chains (Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen 2014). Simi-
larly, if buyers merely demand that their suppliers meet cer-
tain standards, this often does not lead to desired outcomes 
(Pedersen and Andersen 2006).
Acknowledging these limitations of unilateral and bilat-
eral governance, firms have therefore scrambled to join 
cross-sector collaborations called multi-stakeholder ini-
tiatives (MSIs). MSIs are generally initiated and driven by 
societal actors and joined by stakeholders including gov-
ernments, firms, trade unions and suppliers. Since their 
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inception, MSIs have been considered to be a useful way 
to overcome the limits of unilateral and bilateral govern-
ance mainly through the combination of complementing 
resources and competences of participating organisations 
(Fransen 2011). Some MSIs focus on establishing stand-
ards and developing monitoring mechanisms, while others 
issue certificates and accreditations for certain qualifica-
tions (Utting 2002). Yet, of late, there have been growing 
concerns and critical views on the effectiveness of such a 
collaborative approach, although it can be hard to measure 
their impact and performance (Egels-Zandén and Wahlqvist 
2007; Fransen and Kolk 2007; Kolk 2013).
Although traditionally buyers hold significant power 
over suppliers in the garment industry, some suppliers have 
gained more power based on their enhanced production 
resources and capabilities (Gereffi 2011). Therefore, switch-
ing costs for large and capable suppliers with a bigger cli-
ent pool become smaller (Gereffi 2011). The interviews we 
present also confirm that buyer firms believe that some sup-
pliers have gained sufficient power in supply chains to reject 
buyer initiatives; thus buyer firms have recently been taking 
an alternative collaborative approach to cultivate the neces-
sary power and legitimacy to coerce suppliers into acting 
in accordance with ethical sourcing initiatives. Collective 
actions are actions taken jointly by buyer firms “in pursuit 
of the same collective good” (Marwell and Oliver 1993, 
p. 4), i.e., improved working conditions. So the pendulum 
may be swinging back from the trust-based model towards 
a power-based model, driven by coercion and top-down 
control but exercised through collaborative governance, not 
direct bilateral relationships. This study is prompted by the 
observation that buyers sharing the same supply base have 
been establishing coalitions to coerce suppliers to adhere to 
their standards.
We examine the emerging approach of collaborative 
governance, tackling this main question: Why and when 
do buyers from developed countries collaborate with peer 
companies? In addition, we address the possible benefits 
and challenges of such a model. The new approach raises 
novel and interesting questions for scholarly research, that 
go above and beyond existing scholarly work on global sup-
ply chain governance, which has mostly been focused on 
bilateral firm-supplier relationships, e.g. captive, relational, 
and modular relationships, and within-firm issues (Gereffi 
et al. 2005). As value chain governance not only deals with 
economic values but also with social values (Humphrey and 
Schmitz 2001), collaborative governance is an alternative 
way for firms to effectively govern labour issues. A main aim 
of our paper is to compare collaborative governance with 
these other, established bilateral ways of working (Gereffi 
et al. 2005).
This approach involves collaboration of different organi-
sations with conflicting interests, and firms risk knowledge 
spillovers to competitors. Hence, additional transaction costs 
occur when organisations engage in collaborative govern-
ance (Nooteboom 2004). This is true for both buyer and 
supplier firms, hence our conceptual question is when would 
organisations be willing to bear such costs? This in turn begs 
the question what drives partnership formation with com-
petitors, and how does such partnering affect costs (Wootliff 
and Deri 2001)? In our paper, which builds on interviews 
with managers involved in the setting-up and management 
of inter-firm supply-chain alliances and with suppliers based 
in Hong Kong and India, as well as extensive secondary 
data analysis, we examine the theoretical underpinnings of 
these coalitions and critically discuss their effectiveness 
in addressing labour issues in supply chains. In doing so, 
we later seek to reconcile our exploratory findings with the 
theory of value chain governance (Gereffi et al. 2005). Thus, 
one scholarly contribution of our study is that we contrast 
and compare collaborative governance with various bilateral 
governance modes.
Existing literature sees reputational interdependency as a 
strong driver of such buyer-led initiatives (BLIs) (e.g. Bar-
nett and King 2008; Fauchart and Cowan 2014) and evalu-
ates the effectiveness of collaborations based on factors and 
dynamics of the participating buyers e.g. free-riding, oppor-
tunistic behaviours (e.g. Lenox and Nash 2003; Prakash and 
Potoski 2007). The literature also looks at the legitimacy of 
BLIs as private regulations (e.g. Egels-Zandén and Wahl-
qvist 2007; Vogel 2008). Yet, to the best of our knowledge, 
there has not yet been a study into the phenomenon using the 
conceptual perspective of supplier governance. Filling this 
gap, a second contribution of our study is to the literature 
on CSR in global supply chains, specifically in explicating 
the conditions under which different governance modes are 
appropriate. Finally, we contribute to the theory of global 
value chains by highlighting an additional type of govern-
ance that, under the right conditions, is particularly useful 
in addressing social issues in supply chains.
This study produces relevant insights for practitioners 
too. Labour problems in supply chains are more than “minor 
upstream inconveniences” (Jiang et al. 2009, p. 169). They 
often receive wide media coverage and attract negative pub-
lic interest. Several studies have reported that accusations 
of unethical practices in supply chains may lead to erosion 
of market positions and can result in substantial damage to 
brands (Emmelhainz and Adams 1999; Frenkel and Scott 
2002; Nelson and Zadek 2000). Acknowledging diverse 
relationship dynamics in global supply chains, we provide 
guidelines for practitioners to refer to when they decide on 
the most suitable governance mode considering the power 
dynamics with suppliers. In pursuit of effective and efficient 
measures to tackle the problem, firms in a relatively weaker 
position could proactively form and join alliances with 
other firms that share the same supply base while carefully 
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comparing potential opportunities and costs. Collaborative 
governance thus provides managers with an additional rep-
ertoire to draw upon.
We proceed with more background on buyer–supplier 
relationships and labour issues. Then, we introduce our 
empirical research method, report the findings, and end with 
a discussion and conclusions.
Background
Buyer–Supplier Relationships and Labour Issues: 
Towards a New Coercive Model
In the 1970s, the footwear and apparel industry started a 
trend of offshoring and outsourcing production to develop-
ing countries where abundant, cheap, low-skilled labour 
was available (Lim and Phillips 2008). While this reduced 
upstream costs, it also created a number of unintended 
adverse consequences, including mistreatment and exploi-
tation of labour in supplier firms (Emmelhainz and Adams 
1999). Since the early 1990s, a series of irresponsible busi-
ness practices in developing countries has provoked vigorous 
criticism from the public and from non-governmental organ-
isations (NGOs) (Kolk 2003). Household names, including 
Nike, Walmart, Gap, and H&M, were held responsible for 
sweatshop conditions in factories in the developing countries 
where their branded goods were produced (Emmelhainz and 
Adams 1999; Frost and Burnett 2007). As recently as 2012 
and 2013, deadly fires in several supplier factories and the 
collapse of the Rana Plaza complex in Bangladesh under-
scored the persistence of the problem (Wieland and Hand-
field 2013).
Firms initiated actions to combat such labour issues in 
supply chains from the early 1990s onwards. In 1991, Levi 
Strauss, followed by Nike in 1992, adopted firm-specific 
codes of conduct and internal audits focusing specifically 
on labour rights and working conditions (Murphy and Mat-
thew 2001; Pedersen 2006; Roberts 2003; Van Tulder and 
Kolk 2001). This practice became widespread as other firms 
were subjected to strong institutional pressures (Jørgensen 
et al. 2003).
Simultaneously there was a growing need for univer-
sally applicable standards, such as global reporting initia-
tives (GRI) and the UN Global Compact. These globally 
applicable standards provide guidance for firms to prepare 
standardised codes (Albareda 2013). And the application 
of standards requires firm level action as firms share glob-
ally agreed codes of conduct and the implementation is still 
expected to be carried out by individual firms, with little 
need for collaboration between firms (Fransen 2011; Fransen 
and Kolk 2007; Lund-Thomsen 2008; Rasche 2012). Even 
though global standards can, albeit in a very limited way, 
address the issues of one-sidedness and inconsistency of 
corporate codes of conduct, the lack of specificity and the 
absence of enforcement mechanisms still remain (Fransen 
and Kolk 2007; Rasche 2010).
The limitations of codes, standards, and monitoring 
could be overcome by a relational, trust-based approach 
(Soundararajan and Brown 2016). Cooperation with suppli-
ers includes ongoing two-way conversations, information 
sharing, and training (Andersen and Skjoett-Larsen 2009; 
Lim and Phillips 2008; Locke et al. 2007). The assumption 
here is that the proactive involvement of suppliers that strive 
for a long-term relationship may lead to better compliance 
(Dyer and Singh 1998; Lim and Phillips 2008). However, 
the collaborative approach is complicated by the globaliza-
tion of supply chains, where buyer firms source their prod-
ucts from several suppliers that can be located in different 
countries and suppliers also serve multiple buyers (Utting 
2002). This makes it costly and almost impossible to build 
and sustain cooperative relationships across supply chains 
that may include hundreds of suppliers (Lund-Thomsen and 
Lindgreen 2014).
In parallel, multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) emerged; 
MSI is a broad concept and includes private organizations, 
i.e. firms, competitors, NGOs, and trade unions, as well as 
governments, and is initiated and driven by societal actors/
organisations in the majority of cases (Baur and Schmitz 
2012; O’Rourke 2006; Rasche 2012). Over time, MSIs have 
evolved and now include a number of standards, monitor-
ing mechanisms and accreditation for certain qualifications 
(Fransen 2011; Utting 2002). Representative examples of 
MSIs include ethical trading initiatives (ETI), FLA (fair 
labour association), and social accountability international 
(SAI). ETI is run by its membership and members adopt 
the ETI base code in pursuit of improvement of workers’ 
rights (Utting 2002). FLA is driven by universities and civil 
society organisations aiming to resolve labour issues mainly 
through setting standards and conducting external audits and 
accrediting companies. SAI is a multi-stakeholder organisa-
tion that has established SA8000 to promote labour rights 
and decent working conditions around the globe. Although 
there are a number of MSIs, even overlapping in terms of 
purposes and functions, they have not fully resolved issues 
in global supply chains and are often criticised for the lack of 
enforcement mechanism and for being abstract and nominal 
institutions that simply issue membership certificates and 
accreditations (Utting 2002).
One of the main causes of continuing problems, either 
with corporate or global standards, is the governance of sup-
ply chains (e.g. monitoring, audits and remedial actions) that 
eventually boils down to individual firms. Suppliers seldom 
welcome investigation through audits (Morali and Searcy 
2012). Audits are costly and smaller buyer firms and sup-
pliers often do not have the financial or human resources 
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needed for repeated audits (Ciliberti et al. 2011; Utting 
2002). In addition, it is easy for suppliers to deceive the 
buyer if repeat audits take place sporadically and last only a 
few days (Egels-Zandén 2014; Plambeck and Taylor 2016).
Acknowledging the real-life difficulties and limitations 
of existing governance mechanisms, a different type of col-
laboration is emerging that is co-led by competing buyers 
in an effort to increase leverage over suppliers as well as 
the level of dependence by suppliers, to eventually induce 
a higher level of compliance and cooperation. Generally, 
firms enter into an alliance when they foresee a strategic or 
financial benefit in doing so (Kale et al. 2002), including 
firms in vulnerable positions (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 
1996). Buying firms that account for only a small amount 
of the total production of a supplier are an example of such 
a position as they lack enforcement mechanisms. Thus, they 
ally with each other and combine their resources, relative 
power to the suppliers, to increase their leverage (Das and 
Teng 2000). For resources they cannot obtain through intra-
sector collaboration, they pursue cross-sector collaboration, 
specifically by reaching out to NGOs and accessing their 
expertise (Rondinelli and London 2003). As such, participat-
ing firms and NGOs complement each other in collaborative 
governance.
This new governance mode has been categorised as 
a sub category of MSI that is often called a business (or 
industry)-driven initiative (BDI); in this study we use the 
term collaborative governance to conceptually differentiate 
it from the other forms of MSI and to focus on its benefits 
and drawbacks. Collaborative governance involves multi-
ple parties but is characterised by proactive and collective 
actions driven by businesses, not by societal actors/organi-
zations. Collaborative governance is more focused in terms 
of attempts to address specific issues, gathering around a 
shared supply base rather than trying to develop a cure-all. 
This aims to coerce suppliers and curb their potential oppor-
tunism with very specific purposes, target suppliers/coun-
tries/issues; in so doing it is assumed that buyer firms reduce 
the chances that labour problems will occur, or at least lower 
their severity. Coercive strategies take the form of “threats, 
promises, and/or legalistic pleas” (Frazier et al. 1989, p.59). 
The assumption here is that the threat of punitive action is 
more effective if it comes from a collective rather than from 
a single firm.
Method
To understand how this collaborative governance model 
operates, we conducted an exploratory study. An explora-
tory qualitative study is appropriate, given limited existing 
knowledge on this topic and our focus to theorize around it, 
rather than formally test hypotheses. For the first phase of 
our study, we selected study participants, who were identi-
fied from firms that were actively engaged with collaborative 
governance. Firms had to meet three key criteria for inclu-
sion in this study. First, labour issues in supply chains had 
to be a relevant problem for them, as expressed in the media 
or public debate. Second, their annual or standalone CSR 
reports had to demonstrate that they were actively seeking 
some solution(s) to address these issues. Third, they had to 
be a part of a formal coalition or alliance addressing labour 
issues in supply chains.
For our empirical investigation, we chose the retail 
clothes sector because of its long history with labour issues 
in supply chains. Clothing retailers have borne the brunt of 
public criticism and media scrutiny over labour issues in 
their suppliers’ factories. The companies selected for the 
first phase of our research varied in size, target consumer, 
and ownership type, as shown in Table 1. This diversity was 
intentional to enable us to capture the drivers for the forma-
tion of alliances and the differentiated impact on manage-
ment of people at supplier factories. Through snowballing 
we included in our interviews NGOs frequently mentioned 
in earlier interviews with buyer firms. Given our interest in 
how firms seek to exploit collaborative governance, most 
interviews were with firm representatives.
Primary data were acquired from interviews with firm 
representatives in charge of CSR policies in supply chains, 
managers from NGOs and suppliers. Interviews were semi-
structured and centred on collaborative strategies to address 
labour issues in supply chains. The organisations and inter-
viewees are not revealed, to protect their identity. The com-
pany names are denoted by alphabets to anonymise them 
(see Table 2). Extensive secondary data were collected to 
corroborate the interview data and included firms’ archived 
documents, other organisations, online sources, and the 
media. Interviewees’ responses were compared, confirmed, 
or challenged by these documents so we could avoid method 
bias through triangulation (Podsakoff et  al. 2012). The 
sources for our data are shown in Table 3.
Thus, in phase one of our data collection process, we 
conducted 11 interviews with CSR/sustainable-sourcing 
representatives from UK and Danish retailers, a repre-
sentative of an MSI and a representative of a supplier 
company (Hong Kong based). After an initial preliminary 
analysis of our data to the initial set of questions in phase 
1 interesting areas emerged leading to further questions, 
such as: What difficulties do suppliers face in ensuring 
decent work; how do they experience the multiple eco-
nomic and social pressures by buying companies; would 
suppliers welcome a changed approach where their buy-
ers will jointly engage them? Furthermore, it made sense 
to corroborate the buyer-side findings with some supplier 
data; even though our research question focuses on buyer 
strategies, we wanted to rule out biases these buyers might 
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have in reporting on a sensitive topic like this. Thus, we 
embarked on a second phase of data collection, where we 
conducted more interviews with informants from suppliers 
and suppliers’ suppliers. The characteristics of the sample 
companies, data source, the list of informants/interview-
ees and summary of interviews in phase two is detailed 
in Table 4.
Analysis and Findings
Guided by the theoretical thematic analysis process sug-
gested by Braun and Clarke (2006), the in-depth data analy-
sis of data from both phases began with sufficiently famil-
iarising with the collected interview data. This first step 
entails thorough transcription of all verbal expressions and 
repeated readings of the transcripts. The transcribed inter-
view data were first coded and divided into concepts. The 
concepts were mostly predetermined, based on a literature 
review, and guided the interview processes. The concepts 
Table 1  Summary of interviews (phase 1)
Period November 2014–June 2016
Types Face-to-face (2), skype (4), phone (3), written (2)
Duration (range) 30–90 min
Firms
 Products served Apparel, footwear, home products, food, luxury fashion
 Types Public (3), private (3)
 Number of interviewees 9
 Designations of interviewees Director of sustainable business, head of sustainable business, head of 
responsible sourcing, former manager of international distribution, CSR 
program manager, former ethical sourcing coordinator, CSR manager, 
ethical trading team
 Country UK, Denmark, Hong Kong
 Number of employees (range) 10,000–80,000
 Firm revenue (range) $2000 million–$10 billion
Non-profit enterprise
 Description Pursuing transparency across supply chain by implementing technologies
 Number of interviewees 1
 Designation of interviewee Director/founder
Multi-stakeholder initiative
 Description Providing a forum for firms, trade unions, and NGOs to share best practices
 Number of interviewees 1
 Designations of interviewee China representative
Table 2  Characteristics of the sample companies in phase 1
Company ID Type Origin Ownership
Company A Multinational retailer UK Public
Company B Retailer UK Public
Company C Luxury brand UK Public
Company D Fashion brand UK Private
Company E Retailer Denmark Private
Company F Garment manufacturing 
supplier
Hong Kong Private
Table 3  Data sources (phase 1)
Data source Details
Interviews 11 interviews with current/former CSR practitioners of different organisations including retail companies, NGOs, and 
a supplier, conducted face-to-face, by Skype, telephone and written communication. Further details can be found in 
Table 1
Corporate reports 35 reports published by the companies interviewed between 2000 and 2016, e.g. CSR reports, sustainability reports, 
human rights reports, codes of conduct
Company websites CSR, ethical trading and partnership information available on the websites of the companies interviewed
Published news articles 
and scholarly articles
469 articles and commentaries published by the media 2000–2016, accessed from the FACTIVA database and Google 
searches/Google Scholar
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were then reorganized and regrouped as categories. The 
categories were chosen as they were the most predomi-
nantly and frequently mentioned aspects from the data set, 
which were broadly about challenges in current practices 
and efforts to address the issues. And they were agreed by 
the co-authors who independently read the data. Next, the 
data extracts were displayed with categories, and all extracts 
were compared to reveal similarities, patterns, and causality 
(Miles and Huberman 1994). Through this approach, four 
main overarching themes: drivers, implementation, implica-
tions for labour issues, and challenges, and eight sub-themes 
were identified. At this stage, to ensure the homogeneity of 
data extracts under the same themes and the heterogeneity 
of the different themes, there was a recursive reading back 
and forth between the data set and the data extracts (Patton 
1990).
Drivers for Collaborative Governance
The governance of global value chains of the garment indus-
try has been categorised into two major types; (a) the captive 
type where focal firms hold absolute power over suppliers 
and (b) the relational type where the relationship between 
focal firms and suppliers are established based on mutual 
trust (Gereffi et al. 2005). Of late, however, an increasing 
number of suppliers are gaining power through their com-
petencies, and these dynamics lead to modular governance 
(Gereffi et al. 2005). As value chain governance includes 
‘how’ products are made (Humphrey and Schmitz 2001), not 
only the transaction-specific factors but also labour issues 
have been dealt with mainly by the three governance modes. 
The analysis of the interview data reveals that the three value 
chain governance modes, captive, relational, and modular, 
are indeed of use in addressing labour issues in the garment 
industry supply chains as suggested by Gereffi et al. (2005) 
(see Table 5). However, since all of these modes are not 
free of limitations, buyer firms opt for collaborative govern-
ance to address two major interrelated issues: inverted power 
asymmetry and informational asymmetry.
Power Asymmetry
The garment industry is typically considered to be the place 
where captive governance is operative since a buyer has less 
dependence and a supplier has higher dependence on the 
relationship. This case might seem better, as it is now the 
buyer who has the power. However, all of our interview-
ees affirmed that simply auditing, monitoring, and enforc-
ing buyer regulations would not improve working condi-
tions or labour rights in factories. Continuous support and 
Table 4  Characteristics of the sample companies in phase 2
Company ID Type Origin Ownership Designations of interviewees
Company G Garment material supplier India Private Director of Procurement and CSR
Company H Garment material supplier US Private Director of Sales and CSR
Company I Garment material supplier Bangladesh Private (family owned) Director of Procurement and CSR
Company J Garment material supplier India/Sri Lanka Private CEO
Company K Garment material supplier India Private (family owned) Director of Business Development
Company L Garment material supplier India Private CEO
Table 5  Governance types, characteristics, effectiveness
Governance types
Captive Relational Modular Collaborative
Characteristics
 Power asymmetry High (B > Ss) Low (B ≈ S) Low (Bs ≤ Ss) High (Bs ≥ S)
 Opportunities High compliance High cooperation Low switching costs High compliance
 Challenges Opportunistic behav-
iours of suppliers
Difficult to develop 
and maintain
Low motivations for sup-
pliers to comply
Difficult to reach 
consensus among 
buyers
Applicability of standards and programmes
 Corporate
  e.g. NIKE corporate code of conduct
High High Low –
 Global
  e.g. SA8000, GRI, UN global compact
High High Low-medium Medium
 Supplier-/issue-specific – High – High
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communication are necessary, since otherwise the supplier 
might simply try to cheat and manipulate data. A supplier 
which is not fully convinced of the need for improvements 
is easily tempted toward guile instead of making efforts to 
address issues. As the director of sustainable business of 
Company A put it:
I think we need to have minimum standards. But that 
will never be enough to drive the transformation that 
we want to see… And what we found really successful 
is that we find ways to inspire our suppliers so that they 
believe this is good for their business.
The analysis of secondary data reveals that some of the firms 
in the study have as few as 200 suppliers and others nearly 
700 (2016 CSR report, Company A; 2016 CSR report, 
Company D). The suppliers are dispersed around the globe, 
from 29 to 41 countries. Given that some big suppliers own 
multiple factories, the number of factory sites that require 
audits and monitoring increases exponentially. For exam-
ple, one of the firms in our study had around 200 suppliers 
using 800 factory sites (2016 CSR report, Company D) and 
another had 662 suppliers and used 1965 factory sites (2016 
CSR report, Company B). At the same time, the number of 
suppliers used is increasing over time. These figures do not 
include sub-suppliers, and the numbers will dramatically 
increase when taking sub-suppliers into account. Accord-
ing to our analysis of firms’ reports, most of the firms do 
not fully complete annual audits for individual factory sites. 
Company C, working with the smallest number of facto-
ries, claims it completed 100% audits in 2015 (2016 CSR 
report, Company D), while the firm with the largest num-
ber of suppliers recorded 49% completion in the same year 
(2016 CSR report, Company A). Our analysis of the reports 
demonstrates how unlikely it is for firms to communicate 
with every single supplier and convince them to responsibly 
run their factories when they are not able to complete one-
off audits.
Moreover, considering that in most cases, the suppliers 
are in countries that are politically, economically, and legally 
less developed, interviewees reported that the problem is not 
always with suppliers not wanting to fix issues, but with their 
governments and society not pushing them or supporting 
them sufficiently to do so. In this case, the proactive involve-
ment of buyers plays a more significant role. As the China 
representative of an NGO confirms:
Social auditing is very corruptive in China. So the idea 
is really to go beyond social auditing and to have really 
workers’ engagement and invest money on capacity 
building instead of just monitoring repetitively and 
meaninglessly.
In principle, relational governance based on a coopera-
tive relationship can reduce transaction costs and enhance 
value outcomes (Atrek et al. 2014; Dyer 1997; Dyer and 
Singh 1998; Uzzi 1997). Mutual trust and/or commitment 
is required for cooperation between a buyer and a supplier 
(Morgan and Hunt 1994). Most of the interviewees con-
firmed that their firms have policies to develop and help 
suppliers to enhance working conditions in their factories. 
They try to build trusting relationships by ensuring suppli-
ers that they will not abandon the relationship, asking for 
commitment from suppliers in return. When they become 
aware of issues such as child labour, unethical behaviour or 
illegal discrimination, and safety violations, they give the 
factories time and, if necessary, resources to address them. 
Once there is evidence that suppliers are willing to make an 
effort to improve, the brands try to support them. A CSR 
program manager of Company B described their approach:
What we have to do is to send them a clear message 
that we are going to work with them. We have local 
teams. We are not going to charge them for all the 
advice and support. We do free training every month. 
In China, we do age verification, management sys-
tems, working hour training, all screening, every sin-
gle month, in three different locations. We provide the 
support, the advice, the expertise, the knowledge.
Similarly, the director of sustainable business of Company 
A noted:
Our policy is not to just walk away from suppliers. I 
think there’s different situations, when we check on the 
suppliers on board, we recognize that they will take 
some time to get to the standard that we want…. But 
as long as we can see evidence of improvement and 
that they share the same set of values and the same 
aspiration to get to the standard, we will continue to 
work with them because we believe that’s the most 
responsible approach.
On a similar note, a former ethical sourcing coordinator of 
Company C reported:
We continuously work with them and talk to them 
face-to-face or on the phone to help them to achieve 
those things. It’s not like we impose a policy on them. 
But we actually work with them all the time so they 
can improve themselves.
Relational governance is probably the best and ideal way to 
address labour issues. A brand and a supplier make attempt 
to work together and cooperate on a basis of mutual trust and 
commitment. However, this is almost exclusively possible 
in a relationship where both parties are highly dependent on 
each other. In the garment retail industry, where manufactur-
ing requires few brand-specific skills, most suppliers serve 
multiple buyers, and at the same time brands are likely to 
source products from multiple suppliers. Therefore, rather 
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than long-term relationships, we mostly find arm’s-length 
relationships, in which either the buyer or the supplier is less 
dependent on the relationship, or neither party is particularly 
reliant on the relationship.
Perhaps surprisingly, buyer firms in the industry perceive 
large suppliers as having acquired substantial power over 
them. Large suppliers have the capacity to supply many 
brands simultaneously and are, therefore, less receptive to 
pressure from buyer firms. Switching costs are reported to be 
very high for buyers, because the initial investment in find-
ing and establishing a relationship with the right suppliers 
is substantial (Harms et al. 2013). Unless they do invest a 
sufficient amount of searching costs, they are likely to end up 
with similar problematic suppliers (Wieland and Handfield 
2013). Our respondents, therefore, challenged the notion that 
buyers dominate the supply chain. This is evidenced by the 
head of responsible sourcing of Company A:
I think where it is typically challenging is where you 
have no leverage. So if you buy very, very little from 
the supplier, it’s at the very beginning of the relation-
ship, and maybe you have been buying there for a cou-
ple of weeks, it’s therefore very difficult to influence 
that organisation to make change happen.
Under this kind of scenario, pressure might even give the 
supplier an incentive to leave the relationship, as noted by 
the director of sustainable business of Company A:
… they [suppliers] will probably not want to supply us 
anyways because more and more suppliers can choose 
who they sell products to.
The last scenario where neither party is dependent on a rela-
tionship, which makes market governance come into play, is 
not discussed as a governance mode in the garment industry 
by Gereffi et al. 2005) but in fact common in practice. And 
in such relationships, addressing labour issues is rarely pri-
oritised. When an issue is detected, the easiest and simplest 
option for a buyer firm is to exit the relationship. Consider-
ing the low level of dependence, finding a new supplier that 
has the capacity to produce the same goods is not likely to be 
problematic. But, as we pointed out earlier, it is highly likely 
that an alternative supplier’s operations will have similar 
issues. Hence, the buyer firm has an incentive to try and find 
a way to address the issue and keep current relationships. 
However, a supplier’s low level of dependence significantly 
reduces the supplier’s incentive to comply and increases the 
likelihood that the supplier will exit the relationship.
One of the firms in our study reported that 38 relation-
ships out of 1965 were terminated due to non-compliance 
in 2015 (2016 CSR report, Company B). Company C had to 
leave its Chinese supplier in 2012 when it was discovered 
that the supplier was exploiting workers. The supplier was 
producing for multiple Western customers and Company C 
was sourcing only 3% of the supplier’s entire production, 
and which means low dependence from the supplier on the 
relationship. Neither of the two companies provided any 
detailed reasons for the extreme decisions in the report, but 
the interviews and secondary data indicate that those deci-
sions are usually made when suppliers show little intention 
to address labour issues at their sites.
One of the firms reported that 80% of their products are 
made by the top 10% of suppliers, while they source small 
amounts from the rest of the suppliers (2016 CSR report, 
Company D) and these relationships are likely to be arm’s-
length, where conversation and persuasion are not likely to 
work. Two respondents also acknowledged that this approach 
is only effective with a limited number of key suppliers:
In Bangladesh, our top three suppliers are quite big. 
They have grown with [our organisation]. So we are 
a very large customer and we have been collaborating 
with them ever since we started going into Bangla-
desh. So here we have a lot of leverage. And we are 
not demanding or asking them to do specific things. 
We are having an open and honest and equal dialogue 
about how to improve things.
I think key suppliers, normally, they appear to be good 
also at CSR.
The same applies to suppliers as well. Company F in our 
study, a Hong Kong-based supplier, remarks in its sustain-
ability report that it collaborates only with key clients (2016 
Sustainability report, Company F). In the same sense, the 
interviews with suppliers also confirmed that the suppliers 
tend to more actively engage in the requirements from bigger 
buyer than from smaller ones (Company I, J, K).
Power asymmetry is more pronounced with relatively 
small buyer firms. Even though one of the firms in our study 
is a well-established and well-known brand, some of its 
larger suppliers consider it a small buyer, and it, therefore, 
has little power over them. As the director of sustainable 
business in Company A stated:
The challenges are though [our firm] like many retail-
ers has very few sites where we are the only or a very 
significant customer. In most sites we are one of many 
customers….
Similarly, one of our interviewees, a former ethical sourcing 
coordinator of Company C, stressed the difficulty of apply-
ing power:
We are just a tiny company so we have to work with so 
many different brands to achieve some common goal.
For these firms overcoming power asymmetry and enforc-
ing practices on suppliers can only happen if buyers using 
the same suppliers come together to collaborate, to increase 
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the level of suppliers’ dependence, and consequently exert 
leverage over them.
Considering that high dependence on the relationship is 
likely to induce cooperative strategies while low dependence 
makes a party less cooperative, the dependence of suppli-
ers matters more than the level of buyers’ dependence on 
the relationship, which challenges the common belief that 
buyers always play a decisive role. Although game theory 
suggests that through repetition of the same games parties 
would eventually learn that cooperation gives them higher 
pay-offs (Axelrod 1984; Jones 1995), in the global garment 
industry, where buyers and suppliers have to take care of 
multiple relationships dispersed across countries, such 
focused repetition between the two parties is not a viable 
option. In short, bilateral governance, either captive or 
relational and of course market governance, could not be 
expected to resolve problems with CSR in most of the rela-
tionships we looked at.
Having realised the limitations of governing global sup-
ply chains individually, buyer firms have come up with an 
idea for a new kind of collaboration, in the form of col-
laborative governance. By forming an inter-firm alliance, 
firms access the resource that are not available otherwise 
(Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996), relative power over 
supplier. This type of governance is therefore expected to 
be especially useful for the firms that are facing difficulties 
since suppliers are not sufficiently dependent on the rela-
tionship. Firms in alliance now can integrate their power 
and ultimately increase their leverage (Das and Teng 2000). 
This move to collaborative governance is prompted by the 
need to shift power from suppliers to buyers, as this at least 
promises the second-best result.
Information Asymmetry
Interviewees confirmed that suppliers have better and more 
information about what goes on in their factories than buy-
ers. A number of factors cause this information asymmetry. 
Interviewees suggested that suppliers have an information 
advantage because of geographical distance and the lack of 
transparency in information process across supply chains 
where critical information is often withheld. Respondents 
also frequently cited the cost associated with acquiring 
information. Our interviewees reported that buyer firms 
allocated limited budgets to CSR issues in the supply chain. 
For instance, the former ethical sourcing coordinator of 
Company C told us:
Sometimes we want to visit the place and it’s too far 
and we don’t have enough budget, so we cannot go and 
talk to them. So it can lead to communication break-
down because we cannot communicate with them. It’s 
too far. We cannot see them and we cannot see the 
farms and actual factories.’
Physical distance generates problems even when a brand has 
power over a supplier. Most interviewees expressed concerns 
about short-burst audits and said they distrusted them, as they 
are considered to be little more than box-ticking exercises, 
with limited understanding of suppliers’ day-to-day activities. 
The China representative of the NGO said:
Audits will always be a snapshot of the day and it is not 
a tool for improvement, it is a tool for control. Not only 
are audits incapable of capturing actual practices, but 
also the results are sometimes not trustworthy for deeply 
rooted, country-specific factors.
In addition to suppliers withholding information, interview-
ees reported that cultural issues lay behind some of the prob-
lems with information asymmetry. Most suppliers are based 
in Asian countries where people are more hesitant to bring 
bad news, and in order to save face tend not to discuss what 
went wrong and what caused failure at suppliers’ factories. The 
China representative of a NGO said:
…[T]hat makes it more difficult to try and find causes 
and therefore come up with good solutions. So these are 
some of the challenges especially around issues around 
safety or worker conditions. … We recommend [our] 
members not to do the social auditing repetitively. … 
[A]uditing is very corrupted in China.
Data also suggest that buyers and suppliers both suffer from 
audit fatigue. Constrained by limited resources, buyer firms 
have to conduct audits on multiple suppliers’ operations and 
at the same time suppliers have to go through several buyer 
audits. This creates additional costs at both ends. Individuals 
involved in audits are often bogged down with paper work, 
with little insight into the real working conditions of suppliers. 
Through collaborative governance, firms can access informa-
tion that other firms have on labour practices in a shared sup-
ply base, which saves costs for participating firms. The CSR 
programme manager of Company B explains that collaborative 
governance could have an impact on reducing the number and 
frequency of excessive and unnecessary audits while increas-
ing the effectiveness of them:
Why are we all having our own audits? Why are some 
factories being audited 10–15 times a year? But the audi-
tors, they have a checklist where 95% of the questions 
are the same. Why not have system where we all trust 
one type of audit and then leave the factories in peace to 
develop, instead of just taking days out of the calendar 
for audits so many times a year?…It is about sharing. 
It’s the key
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Implementation
There is consensus among our interviewees that brands 
alone cannot solve labour issues in supply chains. They 
need assistance from a party that specializes in local con-
texts and specific issues. As a result, they need NGOs 
in a inter-firm coalition, but acting as complementors 
instead of initiators. The aim is to combine complemen-
tary resources, meaning the brands’ financial muscle with 
NGOs’ knowledge and experience in dealing with labour 
issues. (Rondinelli and London 2003). There is a strong 
belief that such joint approaches will ultimately address 
labour issues by coercing particular suppliers, industries, 
and even governments, into action. As a former ethical 
sourcing coordinator of Company C noted:
We will work with other brands. So we will find out 
if other brands are using the supplier as well. And 
then we will try to have a meeting with other brands 
and the supplier together. And then we will also ask 
an NGO to join because they are the third party and 
they can give some fair comments and they know a 
lot about that specific issue.
Tasks once performed by buyer firms are now allocated to 
NGOs. For instance, firms in our study partner with one 
NGO to carry out employee surveys at suppliers’ factories. 
One of the interviewees explained that her organisation 
uses the services of the NGO whenever there is a need to 
obtain information directly from workers, to avoid work-
ers being forced into cooperation or being manipulated 
by factory owners. The NGO has developed a platform 
to approach and contact workers outside factories, using 
text messages or landlines at home, to obtain a realistic 
picture of working conditions. Data are also collected via 
questionnaires sent via mobile phones provided by the 
NGO that are not accessible by suppliers’ management. 
This may alleviate employees’ concerns about retaliation 
from their employers. The director of the NGO argued 
that the brands that sign up for this service are those that 
are most dedicated to resolving issues. This service helps 
these brands to identify issues and put into place appropri-
ate measures to address them, before they lead to major 
incidents.
Brands have also been working with multiple NGOs when 
problems are observed in their supply chains. For example, 
when one of the firms in our study found out that children 
were employed in the manufacturing of clothes for its brand, 
instead of cancelling the contract or dissuading the supplier 
from using under-age workers, they asked a partner NGO 
to step in. Thanks to its expertise and embeddedness in the 
local institutional context, the NGO was able to provide a 
holistic solution that not only enables the children to go to 
school, but also supports the family for loss of income.
Representatives of firms in the alliance meet regularly to 
address the social issues they face. The aim is to agree on 
common ways to approach these challenges and interact with 
shared supply base. The process is described by an NGO 
representative:
They need to bring together all the brands sourcing 
from the same factory to deliver that message and 
use that leverage to influence their suppliers. So they 
need some kind of common action and consistency on 
issues. … It’s much stronger than only for example a 
small brand to deliver a single message to a single sup-
plier. It’s really to maximize the leverage of the whole 
industry to influence suppliers in a country.
Implications
Social issues are complex, especially in multi-level global 
supply chains (Selsky and Parker 2005). Under some cir-
cumstances collaborative governance involving multiple 
buyers and other parties can be an effective alternative for 
tackling the issues, because (a) buyers exchange knowledge 
on shared supply base; and (b) they circumvent problems 
with limited or one-sided dependence in supply chains.
One of the biggest benefits of collaborative governance 
is that participating companies can share information on 
labour practices of shared suppliers. The largest UK retail-
ers (including a firm in our study), came up with an idea to 
establish a platform named Supplier Ethical Data Exchange 
(SEDEX) where brands can share audit information about 
suppliers and effectively reduce audit fatigue. As the head 
of responsible sourcing of Company A explains:
‘We’ve got a problem of audit duplication, let’s 
invite couple of other key retailers to help us how we 
address that’. And that’s what led us to the formation 
of SEDEX.
In their 2017 annual report, SEDEX highlights the signifi-
cant achievement in terms of the increased identification 
and sharing of information on risky practices of suppliers 
(Sedex 2017). Yet, SEDEX is about more than just sharing 
information. Using the information available through the 
SEDEX platform, firms can initiate collaboration as they 
now know who else is using the same suppliers. Again, the 
head of responsible sourcing of Company A explained the 
usefulness of SEDEX:
If it’s an expensive change, it’s not easy to influence 
that if the expensive change is going to be significantly 
more than the profit they are going to make on making 
the product. So that’s why we work with the organisa-
tions like SEDEX where you can get other purchasers 
who are also purchasing from that same site to perhaps 
influence the owner to make the change.
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Fair factories clearinghouse (FFC) works in a similar way 
but is driven by US retailers. FFC has focused on developing 
sophisticated methods to monitor and manage compliance 
and ultimately aims to use the combined leverage to enhance 
practices in the shared supply base.
The impact of collaborative governance can go beyond 
influencing suppliers. Labour issues are often not caused 
by suppliers but by underpinning country level institutional 
characteristics (Fransen 2013). Often national institutions 
supersede regulations established by private firms and/or 
MSIs (Utting 2002). As such, one further role of a coalition 
is to lobby governments. Fundamental changes in labour 
practices can only be expected when national institutions 
change (Utting 2002). All of the buyer firms we interviewed 
confirmed and emphasized the importance of their coali-
tion in influencing a range of stakeholders in their suppliers’ 
home countries. The CSR manager of Company A noted:
If a coalition that is representing a large part of the 
country’s export goes to the government of course they 
can’t and will not just act exactly as industry is tell-
ing them but it has of course some influence on how 
they will make decisions in the future. … We have co-
signed letters to the Bangladeshi government. I know 
the delegations have gone there also with brand rep-
resentatives, and the minimum wage has been raised. 
I think 60% or something. Of course then everything 
else also gets more expensive. House rent, food, eve-
rything. But it has an influence, of course it has that.
Similarly, the CSR programme manager of Company B and 
the head of sustainable business of Company A told us:
If you look at collaboration, as brands, who has eco-
nomic power? The brands. We do. We have the money; 
we have the resource; we are the catalyst to make this 
happen. If we come together, strategically, collabo-
ratively. How many billions do you think the brands 
source from the countries? You think they don’t have 
influence, leverage? Of course, they do.
We learn together, we increasingly work together, 
… so together we are stronger. … What I am saying 
is things can change. If you really want to you can 
change. What it requires is brands come together….
Table 5 enables a comparison between the different gov-
ernance types that exist in the garment industry and draws 
on the work of Gereffi et al. (2005). Gereffi et al. (2005) 
describe three types of bilateral governance; we describe 
each of these and contrast them with collaborate govern-
ance as found in our exploratory study above. Under cap-
tive governance, focal firms can use their own codes of 
conduct and/or adopt global standards established by repu-
table organisations. Due to the power dynamic favouring 
buyers, the level of compliance with standards and policies 
is likely to be high, although there still is a chance that 
suppliers will act in an opportunistic way, taking advan-
tage of physical distance and infrequent audits.
Although it is difficult to achieve, once the relationship 
between a buyer and a supplier is built on a solid founda-
tion, the supplier tends to adhere to standards. The buyer 
and supplier could even jointly develop and tailor stand-
ards and programmes. This is a good way of dealing with 
labour issues in global supply chains if firms are willing 
to bear the setup costs.
On the other hand, the relative power of some large 
and highly capable suppliers tends to be stronger as is 
the case in modular governance (Gereffi et al. 2005), and 
stronger suppliers are less likely to be responsive to buy-
ers’ requirements, and compliance with individual corpo-
rate code of conduct is likely to be lower (Handfield and 
Bechtel 2002).
Transitions from captive to modular governance are 
largely determined by transaction-relevant factors includ-
ing complexity and codifiability of transactions and suppli-
ers’ capabilities (Gereffi et al. 2005). However, as detailed 
in this paper, firms have been engaging in a different kind 
of governance mode to tackle social issues in global sup-
ply chains. In collaborative governance, where focal firms 
combine their resources, it is less likely that participating 
companies choose to apply the code of conduct of one of 
the participants; instead they design new standards (spe-
cifically designed for the supplier/country) or use existing 
global standards. For example, the business social compli-
ance initiative (BSCI), a coalition exclusively open for buy-
ers, decided to create a more specific but harmonised code 
of conduct, using global standards such as ILO conventions 
only as a guideline (Egels-Zandén and Wahlqvist 2007; 
Fransen 2011). In practice, the compliance level of the sup-
pliers under the influence of BSCI has shown significant 
improvement (Hogstetter and Mueller 2013).
Challenges
One of the interviewees, a manager of Company K, con-
firmed that the company is part of collaborative governance 
and sees it positively as it ‘makes good business sense’. Yet, 
the shifting approach we describe here is not without down-
side risks. First, buyers participating in such partnership 
are likely to have different contract details with the shared 
suppliers. Balancing confidentiality with appropriate dis-
closure of competitive information such as price structures 
and product quality. Buyer firms negotiate different contracts 
with suppliers. This affects the level of information sharing 
between buyer firms. As a former ethical sourcing coordina-
tor of Company C put it:
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And actually the difficult thing is with other busi-
nesses, we cannot share everything with each other. 
There’s always this question, ‘How much should we 
share with other brands?’ It creates difficulty in achiev-
ing a common goal of trying to be more sustainable 
or environmentally friendly, or more ethical. So that’s 
the challenge.
The issue with confidentiality could also be a problem 
between firms and NGOs in cases where NGOs are invited 
to join, considering that they have fundamentally different 
agendas (Rivera-Santos and Rufín 2010). In order for firms 
to be open to NGOs about their problems with suppliers, 
there should be a belief that such information will not be 
used to attack them (Rivera-Santos and Rufín 2010; Ron-
dinelli and London 2003). At the same time, for NGOs to 
participate, they should believe that involvement will not 
harm their reputation (Rondinelli and London, 2003). Thus, 
mutual trust among participating organisations is crucial 
for the success of collaborative governance.Furthermore “a 
chain is only as strong as its weakest link.” Differences in the 
levels of motivation and expectation of buyers joining the 
coalition pose another major challenge. Those at the higher 
end with large margins are willing to tolerate an increase in 
labour costs, while those with low margins are more sensi-
tive to increases in the cost of labour. These differences tend 
to drive firms in the coalition toward the lower standards 
as such different levels of commitments from parties in a 
relationship could cause lowered productivity of the alliance 
(Rondinelli and London 2003). A CSR programme manager 
of Company B observed:
Because you’ve got 10 companies in a room and five 
of them want to do something good, three of them 
say, ‘Okay, whatever’, and one of them only wants to 
do this much. You can only do as much as the one that 
says ‘I wanna do this much.’ So they only do what the 
lowest wants.
When it comes to the governance of supplier practices, the 
collective coercive approach helps to push through uniform 
regulations and standards, which reduces suppliers’ ability to 
resist buyer firms’ demands, but at the same time heightens 
suppliers’ perceived sense of unfairness. Thus, coercion has 
the potential to provoke invisible resistance from suppliers. 
For instance, because of fear of retaliation or termination 
of contracts, instead of engaging openly in discussions of 
buyer firms’ demands that would benefit both parties, suppli-
ers may revert to well-documented window-dressing strate-
gies. Lastly, issues related to sub-suppliers are not explic-
itly addressed in the collaborative governance model. Even 
suppliers in our interviews which agree that collaborative 
governance works, find controlling sub-suppliers challeng-
ing. Most interviewees state that they are required by buyers 
to ask sub-suppliers to meet the same standards but do not 
monitor them due to the lack of coordination and resources. 
This calls for further research to examine the real impact of 
the emerging approach on labour practices at sub-suppliers.
Discussion
Given the significant impact of negative publicity that can 
result from labour-related issues in the supply chain, firms 
engaged in offshore outsourcing are developing new ways 
to ensure that their suppliers’ activities are consistent with 
buyer stakeholder expectations, as expressed in policies and 
procedures. Our evidence suggests that firms are increas-
ingly moving from bilateral governance, through either coer-
cion or cooperation, towards collective coercion character-
ized by collaboration with competitors and NGOs. But to 
date there have been few academic studies of this collabora-
tive governance model.
In this paper we have explored the reasons why firms 
from developed countries choose to manage their suppliers 
in developing countries through collaborative governance, 
the use of a coalition of competitor firms and/or third-party 
organisations, to alleviate negative labour conditions in 
sourcing factories. Although this is a buyer strategic choice, 
we also looked at the phenomenon from the supplier side to 
corroborate the evidence. Our findings indicate that both 
buyers and suppliers see significant evidence there are 
conditions under which neither the previous arm’s-length, 
top-down approach of coercion nor the trust-based coopera-
tive approach effectively addresses the underlying causes 
of the problem. From the buyer side collaborative govern-
ance is expected to offer an additional mechanism that can 
help address labour issues at suppliers’ factories. Although 
buyers also acknowledge the challenges that the govern-
ance mode faces in practice, the data analysis highlights that 
implementation can lead to positive outcomes.
The bilateral governance model is bounded by several 
limitations. First, the trust-based cooperative approach is 
theoretically the best option for firms in managing labour 
issues with suppliers as cooperation leads to less monitor-
ing, more compliance, and enhanced performance outcomes 
(Dyer and Singh 1998; Uzzi 1997). Yet, in practice, our anal-
ysis suggests that firms, at least those in the garment indus-
try, are not capable of developing such relationships with all 
suppliers due to the high number of suppliers with short con-
tract periods or low sourcing value. Our analysis shows they 
only can maintain such relationships with a small number of 
key suppliers. Theoretically, the top-down approach is only 
effective when the buyer is less dependent and, therefore, 
possesses more power (Emerson 1962), and empirically, this 
study confirms that serious labour issues are likely to occur 
when the level of suppliers’ dependence is low.
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Collaborative governance not only helps to exchange 
knowledge and develop best practices but is also a more 
effective means of coercing shared suppliers into action and 
instigating their cooperation, because of greater bargaining 
power and the reduction of costs due to fewer audits (Das 
and Teng 2000; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996). On 
top of the increased power, our study further suggests that 
another critical advantage of collaborative governance is to 
stimulate discussion and knowledge-sharing among buyer 
firms (Rondinelli and London 2003). This can result in the 
pooling of resources to address labour issues.
Our interviewees did not have coherent policies to address 
the underlying causes of labour issues in the supply chain, 
beyond lobbying key stakeholders, such as local govern-
ments, persuasion, collaboration with suppliers, collective 
threats, and forceful coercion. The question of the extent to 
which collaboration and coercion mechanisms can really be 
distinguished from each other provides an interesting ave-
nue for future theoretical and empirical research. We would 
expect collective coercion to weaken collaboration between 
buyers and suppliers. Furthermore, suppliers could counter-
act increased dependence on buyer firms by moving up the 
value chain and becoming direct competitors. An increase in 
disposable income in emerging economies is already making 
major suppliers in developing countries less reliant on west-
ern markets, and some suppliers are increasingly producing 
and selling their own branded goods (Wan and Wu 2017).
We observe that the new approach will enable buyer firms 
to increase their leverage based on the increased relative 
power and more abundant and more accurate information 
about labour practices, and suppliers may cooperate as 
they see the governance mode makes business sense. But 
this may not necessarily result in improvement in workers’ 
conditions since the problem of enforcement remains along 
with the challenges associated with the management of the 
partnerships between buyers and NGOs. Acknowledging 
this limitation, the collaborative approach does not aim to 
substitute relational governance. Firms in our study are not 
letting go of the cooperative approach just yet. Interview-
ees indicated that continuous conversation is still an ideal 
way to make changes and convince suppliers that the new 
approach will eventually benefit them. This would enable 
them to overcome the limitations of top-down unilateral 
compliance. Using threats, such as termination of contracts, 
was not emphasized, but the importance of the suppliers 
making sense of improvements, as well as the effectiveness 
of conversations and persuasion, were stressed.
This study acknowledges the challenges faced by the 
practitioners who are willing to tackle the labour issues both 
internally as well as externally. Those practitioners fighting 
against the external difficulties such as institutional distance 
and lack of cooperation from suppliers are also fighting 
internally for more resources and monetary supports from 
firms. We provide pragmatic solutions for those managers 
in small buying firms by suggesting that they should col-
laborate with other buyers and address issues hand in hand 
by increasing overall leverage.
Like any empirical work, our study has some limitations. 
Our conceptual model only applies to the case where buy-
ers are willing to tackle the labour issues in their supply 
chains even in the case where they are smaller (not in terms 
of absolute size, but in terms of relative size of transactions 
compared with other buyers or compared to the entire pro-
duction of a supplier), therefore, less powerful than supplier, 
which means it is hard to generalise the findings to a wider 
population. As there cannot be one size that fits all, the col-
laborative governance is suggested as one of the ways of 
dealing with labour issues. Furthermore, because there is 
still only limited evidence about the effectiveness of this 
approach, we focused more on the principles of this shifting 
approach, rather than its detailed practices. We believe there 
is room for more structured and larger-scale research efforts. 
For instance, it could be helpful to survey a larger number of 
firms on their use of bilateral versus collaborative govern-
ance mechanisms, and how this relates to CSR outcomes.
Conclusion
Labour issues in global supply chains have remained unre-
solved for some decades now,. In this study, we have sought 
to identify the factors driving buyers to join forces, as well 
as collaborate with NGOs, in addressing labour issues in 
suppliers’ operations. In so doing, we identified some root 
causes of failure in bilateral governance, both arm’s length 
and relational, and the extent to which a collaborative gov-
ernance approach offers more practical and effective solu-
tions to these issues. Our findings suggest that coercive 
collaborative governance driven by buyers and practiced 
through inter-firm–NGO coalitions can potentially provide 
better solutions, because it increases supplier dependence in 
relationships, enables buyers to share critical information, 
leads to more effective supplier relationship management, 
and may eventually enable higher levels of compliance. By 
exploring collaborative governance as a new approach in 
managing CSR in global supply chains, this research con-
tributes to the ongoing discussions on CSR in supply chains.
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